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COURTING
CONTROVERSY
First the Mabo ruling, then the 
political advertising case: the High 
Court is clearly turning ‘political’. 
A common Left response is to de­fend parliamentary sovereignty. But 
Angus Corbett disagrees. He argues 
that the supremacy of parliament is 
already a thing of the past.
T
he recent decision of the High Court that 
the federal government’s legislation on 
political advertising was unconstitutional 
raises a number of important issues about 
the nature of Australian democracy and society. It 
comes at a time of great change in Australian politics, 
society and law. Discussion of the Court’s decision 
has, for the most part, been addressed to defining the 
proper role for the High Court in the Australian 
political system. Much of the discussion has ques­
tioned the legitimacy of the High Court’s authority 
to limit the power and authority of Parliament.
While the political advertising case does raise 
these issues this is not the chief reason why it is such 
an important contribution to the ongoing debate 
about the direction and future of Australian democ­
racy. It is an important contribution because, by 
questioning the role of parliament in the Australian 
political system, it brings to the fore one of the great, 
sleeping issues of Australian politics—notably the 
problem of defining an acceptable and effective role 
for parliament in the Australian political system.
In the political advertising case the High Court
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found that parliament’s recent amendment to the 
Broadcasting Act, which had the effect of banning 
political advertising during election campaigns, was 
unconstitutional. The basis of the decision was, in 
general terms, (each of the judges expressed them­
selves slightly differently) that the Constitution em­
bodied an implied freedom of communication in 
political affairs. According to the Court, the amend­
ment to the Broadcasting Act which introduced the 
advertising ban was unconstitutional because, what­
ever the intentions of parliament in enacting the law, 
it limited this implied freedom in an unreasonable 
and unjustifiable way.
The responses which immediately followed the 
High Court’s decision were rather muted and some­
what confused. This perhaps reflects the inchoate 
and rather uncertain perception that the decision 
marks an important turning point in the direction of 
Australian society and government. Critical re­
sponses to the Court's decision have followed two 
paths. One has been to focus on the judicial method 
adopted by the judges; the other has been to focus on 
the changed relationship between the High Court 
and parliament in the form of a challenge to the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty.
The first form of criticism has been concerned 
with the question of whether the High Court is 
capable of making decisions about issues of funda­
mental importance whichhave substantial economic, 
social and political impacts. The subject of a recent 
Debating Final at the University of NSW captures 
this form of criticism—"That the High Court should 
adjudicate and not legislate”. Yet, while discussion
about the institutional capacity of the High Court 
will continue, the primary focus will remain on 
the second path of criticism—the challenge to 
the notion of parliamentary sovereignty.
Parliamentary sovereignty is a legal term 
which describes the ultimate authority of parlia­
ment to pass any law and the duty of courts to 
recognise and enforce those laws where appropri­
ate. As a central element in what is described as 
responsible government it is also a practice and 
an idea which has been central to Australian 
politics and society. On the one hand, the pri­
macy of parliament in Australian politics has 
been supported by a strong belief in the legiti­
macy of majorities. It has been a central tenet of 
Australian politics that a majority should be able 
to decide upon the direction of government. This 
belief in the legitimacy of majorities has been 
political with relatively little concern about the 
capacity of majorities to oppress minorities. This 
is one respect in which the political and legal 
traditions in Australia and the United States 
differ markedly; the American Constitution is 
founded on a basic distrust of majorities.
The legitimacy granted majorities in Austral­
ian political culture has been matched by a high 
level of distrust of courts, especially on the Left. 
At the time of Federation there was a high level 
of concern about the interference of the US 
Supreme Court in labour relations and its gener­
ally conservatively-minded restrictions on the 
capacity of state legislatures to introduce progres­
sive social legislation. Since World WarTwo one 
of the enduring fixations of the Labor Party has 
concerned the conservative impact of decisions 
of the High Court. The primary source of this 
concern was the decision of the High Court in 
1948 declaring that the Chifley government’s 
bank nationalisation legislation was unconstitu­
tional. Indeed, one of Gough Whitlam’s achieve­
ments as opposition leader was to convince Labor 
that the party could work within the framework 
established by the Constitution even though it 
was an essentially conservative and antiquarian 
document.
The decision of the High Court in the politi­
cal advertising case is a fundamental challenge to 
the notion of parliamentary sovereignty and to 
the practice of responsible government. Both the 
method and approach which the court adopted in 
deciding upon the constitutional validity of the 
political advertising law implied a reconsidera­
tion of the significance of the practice of parlia­
mentary sovereignty.
The High Court’s traditional approach to 
determining the constitutionality of Common­
wealth laws required that it decide whether the 
particular law fell within one of the heads of 
power set out in Section 51 of the Constitution. 
This section lists the subjects upon which the
Commonwealth Parliament may legislate, and 
defines the division of legislative power between 
the Commonwealth and the states. If the rel­
evant law fell within one of the heads of power 
included in Section 51, the High Court has not 
(except in some limited circumstances) tradi­
tionally placed any further restrictions upon the 
power of parliament to pass that law. In this way 
the court has been able to divide legislative 
responsibilities between the states and the Com­
monwealth and, at the same time, preserve the 
central notion of parliamentary sovereignty.
In the political advertising case the Com­
monwealth followed this model of argument in 
support of the law. The argument was in two 
parts. The first was to point out that the Consti­
tution included a requirement that the system of 
government would be one of‘representative gov­
ernment’. The second was to assert that the 
decision as to what kind of ‘representative gov­
ernment’ operated in Australia is one left to 
parliament. The only role for the High Court is to 
define the limits of the very broad spectrum 
which, so the argument ran, falls within the 
general description of ‘representative govern­
ment’. In this way the actual form of ‘representa­
tive government’ adopted in Australia would be 
left to the ‘democratic process’—in other words, 
left to parliament to determine.
However, the approach taken by the High 
Court diverged markedly from this model. Hav­
ing found that the Constitution contained an 
implied freedom of communication in relation to 
political affairs, the Court claimed the right to 
decide on whether this implied freedom had been 
unreasonably restricted by the legislation intro­
ducing the advertising ban. Chief Justice Mason 
argued that, in reaching a decision about whether 
the legislation was a reasonable restriction on the 
implied freedom of communication, the Court 
would “give weight to legislative decisions”—but 
that “in the ultimate analysis it is for the Court to 
determine whether the constitutional guarantee 
has been infringed”. In this manner the Court 
substantially qualified the notion of parliamen­
tary sovereignty in two ways—both by defining 
the implied guarantee of freedom of communica­
tion and by claiming the right to decide whether 
the parliament had infringed that freedom by 
introducing the political advertising ban.
In other words, the High Court has used the 
political advertising case to qualify substantially 
the operation of parliamentary sovereignty. The 
importance of this decision cannot, though, be 
reduced to a discussion about either the relative 
capacity of the Court or of parliament. Nor can 
the full significance of the decision be resolved by 
reference to an abstract discussion about the 
legitimacy of Parliament as the elected arm of 
government as against the “unelected judges”.
‘The primacy 
of parliament 
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supported by a 
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The wider legal and political context within 
which the High Court reached its decision renders 
abstract debates about the legitimacy or other­
wise of parliamentary sovereignty as one only of 
historical interest.
Parliamentary sovereignty, and its practice in 
the form of responsible government, represents 
ideas and practices which were first developed in 
the 19th century. Specifically, the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the notion of re­
sponsible government are based on a particularly 
simplistic model of the relationship between in­
dividual citizens and the state. Both are based on 
the assumption that parliament will be the pri­
mary institution which mediates between the 
popularly expressed views of the citizenry and the 
power of the state. In this analysis the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty provided the essential 
flexibility necessary for parliament to mediate 
between the citizenry and the state.
Yet changes in the structure of Australian 
government and society have made the relation­
ship between citizens and the state far more 
complex than this model allows. The range and 
sophistication of economic and social activities 
carried on in the Australian polity, and the ac­
companying growth in systems of regulation to 
support these activities, have created a far more 
complex relationship between civil society and 
the state. The boundary between citizens and the 
state is now more indistinct and the role of 
mediating between citizens and the state is largely 
left to complex and inter-related systems of regu­
lation.
In the last two decades the form of regulation 
used to mediate between citizens and the state 
has changed. During this time there has been a 
general move toward the creation of systems of 
regulation formed around independent regula­
tory agencies. These systems of regulation are 
based on the assumption that specific areas of 
activity—such as broadcasting or the operations 
of companies and of securities markets—are so 
complex that they need dedicated agencies to 
administer the framework within which the ac­
tivities are carried on. Independent agencies like 
the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (now re­
placed by the Australian Broadcasting Author­
ity) and the Australian Securities Commission 
have a wide degree of discretion in administering 
and enforcing the law. They are independent in 
the sense that their controlling members are 
subject to limited direct political direction from 
their relevant ministers.
The role of parliaments in the creation of 
these independent regulatory agencies has been 
chiefly to establish the general principles and 
policies which form part of the framework within 
which the activities are carried on. The adminis­
tration of these principles and policies has then
been delegated to the independent agencies. 
Parliaments and governments have established 
the independent agencies both because it insu­
lates specific areas of activity from immediate 
political control and because it insulates govern­
ments from the day-to-day conflicts which the 
administration of these activities generates. A 
primary consequence of the use of independent 
regulatory agencies is that the relationship be­
tween ‘citizens’ and the ‘state’ is substantially 
modified. The bodies mediating between the 
citizen and the state are bodies created by parlia­
ment—but they are, to a substantial degree, inde­
pendent of it.
In this context the decision of the High Court 
in the political advertising case takes on particu­
lar significance. The Court’s claim to have found 
an implied freedom of communication in the 
Constitution and to be possessed of the power to 
decide upon when that freedom had been unjus­
tifiably transgressed, was made within the con­
text of a scheme of regulation administered by an 
independent agency—the Australian Broadcast­
ing Tribunal. One of the factors the Court con­
sidered when it ruled upon the validity of the law 
banning political advertising was that this par­
ticular law, aimed at particular goals, was intro­
duced into an existing set of laws which generally 
regulated the rights of companies and individuals 
to use the electronic media It was the particular 
and partial nature of this piece of legislation 
which the Court found to be suspect.
In this sense the Court has a problem of 
coming to terms with particular instances in 
which the traditional definition of the function 
and role of parliament no longer adequately de­
scribes the actual function of parliament. The 
limitation which the Court imposed on the power 
of parliament in this case is not just therefore a 
challenge to the centrality of the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The limitation on the 
power of parliament, and the identification of 
implied rights in the Constitution in the political 
advertising case, are the beginning of a long 
process of reassessing the role of parliament in the 
structure of Australian government.
The great importance of the political adver­
tising case is that by challenging the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty it may help to bring 
into focus an issue of primary importance for the 
future of Australian democracy; the appropriate 
role for parliament. The current criticism of the 
political advertising case as a threat to democracy 
because of the limitations which it imposes on 
popularly elected parliaments serves only to ob­
fuscate the discussion of the important changes 
which have taken place in Australian society. ■
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